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I. INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution protects ordinary citizens from unconstitutional tak-
ings.1  However, the prison environment presents unique circum-
stances that call into question the applicability of this protection to
prison inmates.  In fact, many courts have denied prison inmates the
property rights they maintained prior to incarceration.2  One right
that courts have denied prisoners is the property right to the interest
earned on their inmate accounts.3  Yet, not all courts have denied pris-
oners a property right to such interest, creating a definitive split
among the federal courts of appeals.
On one side, courts applying the common law rule of “interest fol-
lows principal” contend that a prisoner maintains a property right to
the interest that accrues on his inmate account.  For example, in
Schneider v. California Department of Corrections,4 the Ninth Circuit
held that a prisoner had a property right to the interest earned on his
inmate account because “interest follows principal” is a “ ‘core’ notion”
that cannot be denied even to a prisoner.5  On the other side, courts
focusing on the unique circumstances of the prison environment con-
tend that a prisoner has forfeited any property right to the interest
earned on his account.  For instance, a prisoner’s lack of property
rights at common law led both the Fourth Circuit in Washlefske v.
Winston6 and the Eleventh Circuit in Givens v. Alabama Department
of Corrections7 to conclude that a prisoner has no property right to the
interest earned on his inmate account and, thus, cannot claim that
such property was unconstitutionally taken.8
In 2011, the First Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with the
same substantial issue in Young v. Wall9 that had previously split the
federal circuit courts.  After the First Circuit analyzed the decisions of
the Fourth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits, it concluded that a prison
inmate lacks a constitutionally protected property right to the interest
not yet paid on his inmate account.10
Part II of this Note describes the traditional sources of property
rights underlying the courts’ opinions and then describes the split re-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”).
2. See, e.g., Givens v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 381 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2004); Washlef-
ske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000).
3. Givens, 381 F.3d at 1064.
4. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
5. Id. at 1200.
6. Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 179.
7. Givens, 381 F.3d at 1064.
8. Id. at 1068–69; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185–86.
9. Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2011).
10. Id. at 51, 55.
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garding inmates’ property rights on interest-bearing accounts among
the federal courts of appeals.  Part II also takes a closer look at Young
v. Wall, examining the facts surrounding the case and the First Cir-
cuit’s opinion.
Part III begins by analyzing the tension surrounding constitutional
rights in the prison environment.  The constitutional protections af-
forded to prisoners are of such importance that the Fourth and Elev-
enth Circuits used the Ninth Circuit’s failure in Schneider to address
the issue as justification for their refusal to follow the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning.  As Young borrows from the analysis in Washlefske and
Givens, Part III next describes two problems with these opinions.
First, an inmate does have a property right in the wages held in his
inmate fund.  Second, the common law rule that “interest follows prin-
cipal” should apply in the prison context.  Finally, Part III addresses
whether interest should follow principal in the prison environment—a
public policy issue left unaddressed by any of the courts’ opinions.
Part IV concludes that when a court completely addresses each aspect
of the issue, a prisoner should have a constitutionally protected right
to the interest that accrues on his inmate account.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Sources of Property Rights
In each case addressing whether a prisoner has a property right to
the interest earned on an inmate account, the prisoner alleged that
the prison’s refusal to pay interest on the funds in the inmate account
amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property.11  The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “private property” shall
not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”12  In order to
state a claim under the Takings Clause, a plaintiff must first demon-
strate that he possesses a constitutionally protected “property inter-
est.”13  Only if the plaintiff possesses such an interest is it necessary
for a court to determine whether the deprivation of that interest con-
stitutes a “taking” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.14  It
11. Id. at 55.  In some cases, the plaintiff also alleges a violation of his procedural due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (noting that the plain-
tiff suggested that he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before
the Rhode Island Department of Corrections could effectuate its policy change of
no longer paying interest on inmate accounts).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. Givens v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 381 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000–01 (1984); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978); Jackson v. Birmingham Foundry &
Mach. Co., 45 So. 660, 662–63 (Ala. 2008)).
14. Id. (citing Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1998));
Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 973 (1st Cir. 1993).
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2013] A PRISONER’S PROPERTY RIGHT 215
is this preliminary determination of whether a prisoner has a pro-
tected property right to the interest earned on his inmate account that
has split the federal circuits.
It is an accepted tenant of property law that the Constitution pro-
tects rather than creates property interests.15  Therefore, to deter-
mine whether one has a constitutionally protected property interest,
and the nature and extent of that interest, the court must look to “ex-
isting rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as [common law or] state law.”16  A unilateral expectation, by
itself, is not sufficient to create a constitutionally protected property
interest.17  As such, the fact that a prison inmate expects that interest
should or will be deposited in his account is not sufficient to create a
protected property interest.  Instead, the source must give rise to a
“legitimate claim of entitlement” to the property.18  The independent
sources that can create a constitutionally protected property interest
include statutory law, policy and practice, and common law.19
1. Statutory Law and Policy and Practice
A state can create a property interest by enacting a statute.20  For
instance, the Ninth Circuit held in Tellis v. Godinez that inmates have
a property right to any interest that accrues on their accounts based
on a Nevada statute providing that inmates are entitled to the inter-
est.21  It is important to note, however, that a state does not have un-
limited power to redefine property rights by statute.22  If a state was
allowed to do so, it would be able to sidestep the arbitrary government
action the Takings Clause was designed to prevent.  As the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated, “[T]he States’ power vis-à-vis property thus operates as a
one-way ratchet of sorts:  States may, under certain circumstances,
15. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998).
16. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
17. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (citing
Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 274 U.S. 651 (1927)); United States v. Wil-
low River Power Co. 324 U.S. 499 (1945)); URI Student Senate v. Town of Narra-
gansett, 631 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710–11
(1976); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
18. Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2005) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
19. See Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2011).
20. See Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that if no
right existed at English common law, a state may subsequently create one);
Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 1998) (explain-
ing that state law may affirmatively create constitutionally protected “new prop-
erty” interests).
21. Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1316–17 (9th Cir. 1993).
22. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982)
(citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)
(“[A] State, by ipse dexit, may not transform private property into public property
without compensation . . . .”)).
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confer “new property” status on interests located outside the core of
constitutionally protected property, but they may not encroach upon
traditional “old property” interests found within the core.”23  As a re-
sult, a state can create a new property interest by enacting a statute,
but it cannot deny an “old property interest,” such as those recognized
at common law.
A state’s policies and practices can also underpin a constitutionally
protected property interest24 by creating a “shared understanding”
that a person possesses a certain property interest.25  Therefore, when
a prison has a unilateral policy stating that interest will be credited to
the inmate’s account, the policy has the potential to create a property
right in that interest.26  However, it is accepted that “[a] policy, once
implemented, need not be continued in perpetuity but, rather, in the
absence of special circumstances (say, detrimental reliance), may be
modified or abandoned prospectively.”27  This ability to abandon a pol-
icy also applies in the prison context.28  As a result, if the payment of
interest is solely based on the prison’s policies or practices, the prison
can unilaterally withdraw its policy of paying interest on inmate
funds.  Yet, a prison cannot deny a prisoner property interests secured
by either statutory or common law, regardless of whether such rights
were reinforced by the prison’s policies or practices.
2. Common Law: “Interest Follows Principal”
A fundamental source of property interests is the English common
law rule that “interest shall follow the principal.”29  Many inmates ar-
gue they have a property right to the interest that accrues on their
inmate funds under this common law rule.  The rule was the subject of
two U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.
v. Beckwith30 and Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation.31  While
23. Schneider, 151 F.3d 1194, 1200–01 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confu-
sions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 309, 329 (1993)).
24. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221–22 (2005); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 556–58 (1974); Givens v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 381 F.3d 1064, 1069
(11th Cir. 2004); cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) ( “[A plaintiff]
must be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his claim of such entitle-
ment in light of ‘the policies and practices of the institution.’”).
25. See Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2011).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 55 (citing Bova v. City of Medford, 564 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that the city may alter or abandon retirement policy)); Biggers v. Wit-
tek Indus., Inc., 4 F.3d 291, 295 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that employer was under
no obligation to continue severance benefits policy)).
28. See Murphy v. Shaw, 49 F.App’x 711, 714 (9th Cir. 2002); Clark v. Perego, No. 92-
3567, 1994 WL 612520, at *1 (5th Cir. 1994).
29. Beckford v. Tobin, (1749) 27 Eng. Rep. 1049 (Ch.) 1051; 1 Ven. Sen. 308, 310.
30. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
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neither of these cases concerned the prison environment, they firmly
established that the interest earned on wages placed in a bank ac-
count is the property of the citizen who performed the labor.
In Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff’s property was subject to an unconstitutional taking when a
Florida statute expressly directed a county to retain interest that had
accrued on an interpleader fund deposited by a private party into the
registry of the court.32  Despite the explicit language of the statute,
the Court held that the county was not entitled to the interest
earned.33  Instead, the Court invoked the “usual and general
rule . . . that any interest on an interpleaded and deposited fund fol-
lows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to
be the owners of that principal.”34  The Court then concluded that
“[t]he earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself
and are property just as the fund itself is property.”35
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to the common law
rule of “interest follows principal” in Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundation.36  In Phillips, the Court analyzed whether the interest
earned on client funds held in a Texas Interest on Lawyers Trust Ac-
count (IOLTA) program was the client’s property.37  Texas’s IOLTA
regulations provided that interest earned on certain client funds held
by lawyers was to be paid not to the clients themselves, but to founda-
tions that financed legal services for the indigent.38  However, the
Court held that the clients possess a protected property interest in the
earnings.39  In so holding, the Court observed that the “interest fol-
lows principal” rule “has been established under English common law
since at least the mid-1700’s [sic]”40 and “has become firmly embedded
in the common law of the various States.”41  As it had done in Webb’s
Fabulous Pharmacies with regard to the Florida interpleader fund
statute, the Phillips Court refused to accord the Texas IOLTA rules
any significance.  Instead, the Court reiterated that “a State may not
31. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
32. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 162.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 164.
36. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 156.
37. Id. at 163.
38. See id. at 162 (citing Tex. State Bar Rule, Art. XI, §§ 3–4).
39. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 171.
40. Id. at 165 (citing Beckford v. Tobin, (1749) 27 Eng. Rep. 1049, 1051 (Ch.) 1051; 1
Ven. Sen. 308, 310 (“[I]nterest shall follow the principal, as the shadow the
body.”)).
41. Id. at 165 & n.5.
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sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property inter-
ests long recognized under state law.”42
B. The Split: Property Rights to the Interest Earned on
Inmate Accounts
Young v. Wall was the fourth court of appeals decision to consider
whether inmates have a constitutionally protected property right to
the interest that accrues on their inmate accounts.43  Prior to Young,
the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits determined that a prisoner has no
such property right.44  The Ninth Circuit focused on the “interest fol-
lows principal” rule to conclude that an inmate does have a property
right in the earnings.45  While each circuit used slightly different rea-
soning to reach their conclusions, each decision proved important to
the First Circuit’s conclusion in Young.46  As such, each decision will
be addressed in turn.
1. Schneider v. California Department of Corrections
In 1998, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Schneider v. Califor-
nia Department of Corrections was the first federal appellate court to
examine whether a prisoner has a property right to the interest
earned on his inmate account.47  The court examined the California
Department of Correction’s policy of withholding the interest earned
on inmate trust accounts.48  While the California statute did not cre-
ate a property right, the Ninth Circuit held that an explicit statute is
not necessary to create a property right:
Notwithstanding the State’s protestations to the contrary, property rights
can—and often do—exist wholly independently of statutes recognizing them
as such.  Indeed, as the Supreme Court’s decisions in Webb’s Fabulous Phar-
macies, Inc. v. Beckwith and Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation demon-
42. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 167 (citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 163–64 (1980)).
43. Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49 (1st. Cir. 2011).
44. See Givens v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 381 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2004); Washlefske v.
Winston, 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000); Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d
1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
45. Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1194.
46. See Young, 642 F.3d 49.
47. Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1194.
48. Id. at 1195–96; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 5008 (West 2006) (specifying that any
interest earned on inmate funds placed in inmate trust accounts shall be allo-
cated not to the prisoners themselves, but rather to the “Inmate Welfare Fund,”
which “shall be used for the benefit, education, and welfare of inmates of prisons
and institutions under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections . . . .”);
Schneider, 151 F.3d at 396 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3075.1(d)(3) (not-
ing that when a prisoner signs CDC Form 345, “a prisoner expressly authorize[s]
any interest earned on monies held for [him] in such trust [to] be deposited into
the Inmate Welfare Fund”).
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strate, constitutionally protected property rights can—and often do—exist
despite statutes, such as § 5008, that appear to deny their existence.49
Further analyzing Phillips and Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, the
Ninth Circuit applied the common law rule of “interest follows princi-
pal” to find a protected property right in the earnings.50  In fact, the
Ninth Circuit stated that this common law rule is so fundamental to
the notion of constitutionally protected property that it cannot be ig-
nored.51  As a result, the Ninth Circuit found “little doubt that inter-
est income of the sort at issue here is sufficiently fundamental that
States may not appropriate it without implicating the Takings
Clause.”52
2. Washlefske v. Winston
Only two years after Schneider, the Fourth Circuit came to the op-
posite holding in Washlefske v. Winston.53  Analyzing the Virginia De-
partment of Corrections’s policy requiring interest earned on prisoner
funds to be used for the benefit of the general prison population, the
court held that a prisoner does not have a protected property right to
the interest earned on an inmate account.54  The Fourth Circuit rea-
soned that because a prisoner at common law had no right to earn
wages for work performed while in prison, any right an inmate cur-
rently possesses extends only so far as provided by statute.55  The
court stated, “[I]f a statute creates a property right not previously rec-
ognized or one broader than that traditionally understood to exist, the
property interest so created is defined by the statute and may be with-
drawn so long as the State affords due process in doing so.”56
While a Virginia statute creates and defines a limited property
right in the wages for penological purposes, it does not grant “full
rights of ‘possession, control, and disposition.’”57  For instance, an in-
mate cannot receive wages as cash and may only spend the wages on
items in the prison commissary, direct that they be sent outside of the
prison to other persons, or use them to purchase other approved
items.58  As the statute only gives inmates limited rights to wages, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that a prisoner does not have a full property
right in the principal itself.59  The Fourth Circuit explained that while
49. Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1199 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 1199–1200.
51. Id. at 1201.
52. Id.
53. Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000).
54. Id. at 181, 185–86.
55. Id. at 184–86.
56. Id. at 184.
57. Id. at 185 (citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found, 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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interest follows principal at common law, it does so only incident to
the ownership of the underlying principal.60  As a result, an inmate
has no property right in the interest accruing on the wages held in an
inmate account.
3. Givens v. Alabama Department of Corrections
In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed both the Schneider and
Washlefske opinions to decide whether an Alabama inmate had a simi-
lar property right in Givens v. Alabama Department of Corrections.61
Evaluating the Alabama state scheme prohibiting inmates from re-
ceiving the interest that accrued on their accounts, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit agreed with the Fourth Circuit and held that an inmate lacks a
constitutionally protected property right in such interest.62  In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court held that the common law rule of “inter-
est follows principal” does not apply.63
First, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the plaintiff’s status as an
inmate could not be ignored because such status was significant at
common law.64  At common law, an inmate not only lacked a property
right in wages from work performed in prison, but could also be forced
to forfeit all rights to personal property.65  Therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the common law rule does not apply to a prison
inmate.66  The court then reasoned “the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Phillips and Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies . . . assumed that a complete
private property right existed in the principal.”67  Yet, the inmate in
this instance had “at most, a limited property right in the principal.
Like the inmate in Washlefske, [the inmate was] not free to receive the
amounts deposited in cash, make withdrawals whenever he [chose], or
spend money without the Department’s approval.”68  As the Alabama
statutes granting such a limited property right were silent as to what
was to become of any interest earned,69 the court concluded that Ala-
bama inmates do not have a property right to the interest that accrues
on their accounts.70
60. Id. at 184 (noting that while interest follows principal, “a prisoner does not enjoy
the same common law property rights in his prison accounts as did the Phillips’
plaintiffs in their attorney trust accounts”).
61. Givens v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 381 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2004).
62. Id. at 1070.
63. Id. at 1068.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1068–69 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
682 (1974)).
66. Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068.
67. Id. at 1069.
68. Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 14-8-6 (1975) (limiting the extent of an Alabama inmate’s
property interest in his earnings)).
69. See id. § 14-8-6.
70. Givens, 381 F.3d at 1070.
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C. Young v. Wall Facts and Holding
In 2011, over thirteen years since the issue was first decided in
Schneider, the First Circuit was confronted with the same substantive
issue in Young v. Wall.71  In Young, the plaintiff was Edward Eugene
Young, Sr., an inmate at a prison maintained by the Rhode Island De-
partment of Corrections (RIDOC).72  While in prison, Young and his
fellow inmates were authorized to pursue gainful, in-prison employ-
ment.73  As a result, Young performed various jobs, and his wages
were deposited into inmate accounts maintained by RIDOC.74  RIDOC
placed twenty-five percent of an inmate’s earnings into an “encum-
bered account,” which was then tendered to the inmate upon re-
lease.75  RIDOC deposited the balance of the inmate’s earnings into an
“available account” with certain limits on what the inmate could do
with those funds.76  In accordance with Policy No. 2.17, an inmate
could purchase items at the prison commissary but could not purchase
proscribed merchandise or make cash withdrawals.77
In the past, the state pooled and invested funds in the individual
inmate accounts and then allocated any return on the investment to
the individual inmate accounts in an equitable fashion based on aver-
age daily balances.78  In 2001, RIDOC decided to outsource its system,
and comments from prospective vendors ultimately led RIDOC to no
longer pay interest on inmate accounts.79  Instead, any earnings of the
collective funds accrued to the State of Rhode Island.80  Because
Young was an inmate at the prison both before and after the policy
change, he sued RIDOC’s director individually and in his official ca-
pacity.81  Ultimately, the main issue confronting the court was
whether RIDOC’s unilateral suspension of its internal policy of paying
interest on inmate accounts constituted an unconstitutional taking of
the inmate’s property under the Fifth Amendment.82
After evaluating the circuit split regarding the issue, the First Cir-
cuit concluded that Young lacked a constitutionally protected property
right to the interest earned on his inmate account.83  The court rea-
soned that the common law rule of “interest follows principal” does not
71. 642 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2011).
72. Id. at 52.
73. Id. at 51 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-56-22 (West 1956)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 52.
80. Id. at 51.
81. Id. at 52.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 51, 54.
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apply in the “highly idiosyncratic context that prison presents”84 be-
cause a prisoner traditionally enjoys fewer constitutional rights than
other persons.85  Further, the court noted that a prison inmate pos-
sesses no right to profit from his labors and could be compelled to work
without pay at common law.86  Despite the Rhode Island statute cre-
ating a property right in inmate wages, the First Circuit rejected the
argument that this statute created a property right because it was
silent on the subject of interest.87  Finally, the court determined that
the State’s policy and practice of paying interest on the accounts did
not provide Young with a property right because the policy was an act
of administrative generosity that could be abandoned prospectively.88
The First Circuit concluded that since Young lacked a property right
to the interest earned on his account, there could be no taking under
the Fifth Amendment.89
III. ANALYSIS
A. Balancing Act: Constitutional Rights in the Prison
Environment
One rationale underlying the opinion in Young v. Wall, as well as
Washlefske and Givens, is that while “interest follows principal” in the
case of an ordinary citizen, the common law rule does not apply to a
prison inmate.90  In fact, these courts used the Ninth Circuit’s failure
in Schneider to directly address the unique circumstances of the
prison environment as justification for their contrary holdings.  For
instance, the Fourth Circuit stated:
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91, 93 (1987); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 54; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-56-22(a) (West 1956) (providing that
inmates “may be permitted to labor in the discretion of the director . . . and in
that case may be paid not more than $3.00 [per] day”).
88. Id. at 55 (noting that “a policy, once implemented, need not be continued in
perpetuity but . . . may be modified or abandoned prospectively”) (citing Bova v.
City of Medford, 564 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the city may
alter or abandon retirement policy)).
89. Id. at 51, 54.
90. See id. at 53 (“The most jagged rent in the fabric of the plaintiff’s argument is his
failure to recognize the highly idiosyncratic context that prison presents.”); Giv-
ens v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 381 F.3d 1064, 1068 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Givens’s argu-
ment ignores both his status as an inmate and the fact that, at common law, such
status was significant.”); Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 184 (4th Cir.
2000) (“Washlefske, as a prisoner, does not enjoy the same common law property
rights in his prison accounts as did the Phillips’ plaintiffs in their attorney trust
accounts” and “the Phillips Court never intended its conclusion . . . to translate to
the prison environment.”).
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In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that we reach a result different from
that reached by the Ninth Circuit in Schneider v. California Department of
Corrections . . . [b]ut the court never determined who “owned” the principal
and to what extent.  We believe that an investigation into that question by the
Ninth Circuit would have produced the same conclusion that we reach
today.91
In Young v. Wall, the First Circuit similarly dismissed the reasoning
in Schneider: “The Schneider court mechanically applied the mantra
that interest follows principal without giving due weight to the trun-
cation of prisoners’ property rights that is characteristic of the com-
mon law.  We think that this limitation easily tips the balance.”92
Thus, it is necessary to first analyze whether and to what extent a
prisoner’s property rights are truncated in the prison environment.
Ordinary citizens have a property right to the wages they earn and
any interest derived therefrom.93  Yet, tension has emerged regarding
whether a prisoner should be afforded the same constitutional rights.
Imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privi-
leges of the ordinary citizen, “a retraction justified by the considera-
tions underlying our penal system.”94  A prisoner is denied these
constitutional rights to accommodate the institutional needs and
objectives of prison facilities, particularly internal security and
safety.95  For instance, a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of
privacy entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable searches and seizures.96  If a prison official had
to obtain a warrant to search an inmate’s cell, it would be impossible
to accomplish the prison objectives of preventing the introduction of
weapons, drugs, and other contraband into the prison environment.97
Though his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies
of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of
constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for a crime.  “There
is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of
this country.”98  For example, prisoners have been held to enjoy sub-
stantial religious freedom under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments,99 retain the right of access to the courts,100 and are protected
91. Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 186 (citation omitted).
92. Young, 642 F.3d at 54.
93. See Young v. Wall, 359 F. Supp. 2d 84, 92 (D.R.I. 2005).
94. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
95. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 555 (1974).
96. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
97. Id.
98. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–56.
99. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
100. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Younger
v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Ex parte
Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
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under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from invidious discrimination based upon race.101  Prisoners can also
claim the protections of the Due Process Clause.102
Ultimately, there must be a “mutual accommodation between insti-
tutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution
that are of general application.”103  Due to the fundamental impor-
tance of constitutional rights, many courts and legal commentators
have concluded that the only constitutional rights that should be de-
nied to prisoners are those necessary to maintain the prison’s institu-
tional needs and objectives.104  For example, “the right to present
evidence is basic to a fair hearing,” but prison inmates are not af-
forded the unrestricted right to call witnesses from the prison popula-
tion because doing so carries “obvious potential for disruption and
interference” with the correctional program of the institution.105
Therefore, prison officials have the “discretion to keep a hearing
within reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may cre-
ate a risk of reprisal or undermine authority.”106  As one court stated,
a prisoner should have “all the rights of an ordinary citizen which are
not necessarily taken from him by reason of his condition as a con-
vict.”107  As a result, it is first necessary to determine whether the
institutional needs of the prison environment necessitate that a pris-
oner be denied a property right to the principal balance of his inmate
account.  If not, an additional analysis must be undertaken in regard
to the interest earned on such accounts.
1. Prisoner’s Property Right to the Balance in His Inmate
Account
In order to determine whether a prisoner has a property right to
the interest that accrues on his inmate account, it is first necessary to
consider whether he has a property right to the principal amount.
This principal amount is composed of the wages the prisoner earns
while imprisoned, which are deposited into his inmate account.  To
some extent, the courts in Washlefske, Givens, and Young all con-
cluded that under English common law, a prisoner did not possess a
101. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
102. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249
(1971); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
103. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.
104. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 523 (1984) (“We have insisted that prisoners be accorded those rights not
fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the
objectives of incarceration.”).
105. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.
106. Id.
107. Anderson v. Salant, 96 A. 425, 431 (R.I. 1916).
33655-neb_92-1 S
heet N
o. 117 S
ide A
      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 117 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB106.txt unknown Seq: 14 14-AUG-13 10:32
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property right to the wages deposited in his inmate account.108  In do-
ing so, two of the courts further reasoned that an inmate did not have
full rights of “possession, control, and disposition” over the wages de-
posited in his account and thus lacked a full property right.109  With-
out a property right in the underlying principal, the prisoner could not
use the common law rule of “interest follows principal” to establish a
property right in the accruing interest.  Yet, each of these explana-
tions fails to account for more recent common law, statutory law, and
Supreme Court precedent.  After a consideration of these sources, it is
clear that a prison inmate has a property right to the wages he right-
fully earns and deposits in his account.
The argument that a prisoner does not have a property right in the
balance of his inmate account begins with an analysis of prisoners’
property rights under English common law.  Generally, the courts
first explained that, at common law, prisoners did not maintain the
same protected property rights in their wages as private citizens.110
These courts further reasoned as follows: “[A]t common law, prison
inmates possessed no right to profit from their labors; they could be
compelled to work without any recompense.”111  Not only did a pris-
oner not have a property right in the product of his labor in prison, but
“he also forfeited all rights to personal property.”112  As a result, the
payment to a prisoner for his labor is purely discretionary on the part
of the state.113  One such court described a prisoner’s earnings by
stating:
[They] are not wages in the realistic economic employer-employee relation-
ship.  They are, rather, a gratuitous payment authorized by the [state] and
made by virtue of an administrative policy promoted and advanced in the best
interests of penology and sociology.  The plaintiff has no inherent legal right
to the payment of this gratuity, nor to determine its form and amount.114
Under this early precedent, these courts concluded that common
law could not provide a prisoner with a constitutionally protected
property right to the balance of his account.115  However, the problem
108. See Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2011); Givens v. Ala. Dep’t of
Corrs., 381 F.3d 1064, 1068 (11th Cir. 2004); Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d
179, 184–85 (4th Cir. 2000).
109. See Givens, 381 F.3d at 1069; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185.
110. Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299)
(“ ‘If . . . a member of any national community violates the fundamental contract
of his association, by transgressing the municipal law, he forfeits his right to such
privileges as he claims by that contract.’”).
111. Young, 642 F.3d at 53; see also Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 184–85 (holding that a
policy of non-payment “would not violate any traditional principle of property
law”).
112. Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185.
113. See Anderson v. Salant, 96 A. 425, 432 (R.I. 1916).
114. Gray v. Lee, 486 F. Supp. 41, 46 (D. Md. 1980).
115. See Young, 642 F.3d at 54; Givens, 381 F.3d at 1069; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 186.
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with the courts’ reliance on these early precedents is that they ignore
the constantly evolving nature of the common law based on changing
conditions and circumstances in society.116  Total abrogation, revision,
or modification of an outdated common law rule is within the compe-
tency of the judiciary to bring the law into accord with current stan-
dards of justice and wisdom.117  When an old rule is deemed to be
unsound or unsuited to present conditions, it should be set aside in
favor of a rule that is in harmony with current conditions and meets
the demands of justice.118  The common law regarding prisoners’
rights has indeed changed dramatically over time.  In Rhode Island, it
is accepted that “[a] convict is neither civilly dead, nor deprived of his
rights of property; and if this be so, he should be entitled to enforce
such right when it is necessary to do so.”119  Another court concluded
that “a convict can have an interest in property.”120
Modern jurisprudence throughout the United States reinforces the
conclusion that the common law no longer supports denying a prisoner
a property right in the wages he earns while in prison.  In fact, the
early common law regarding a prisoner as a slave lacking property
rights has been routinely repudiated.121  For instance, in 1970, a fed-
eral district court observed that “[o]ur enlightened concern for individ-
ual human rights as it has penetrated prison compounds has taken us
a long way from the judicial attitudes of the past . . . .”122  It is now
well-established that “prison walls do not form a barrier separating
prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution,”123 and
courts have consistently rejected the harsh common law doctrines that
were relied on to conclude that a prisoner did not have a property
116. See Young v. Beck, 251 P.3d 380 (Ariz. 2011).
117. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); see also Handeland v. Brown, 216
N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 1974) (stating that when common law principles are no longer
supportable in reason, they are no longer supportable in fact); Woods v. Lancet,
102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951) (“We act in the finest common-law tradition when we
adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense justice.”).
118. See Mo. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller, 299 S.W.2d 41 (Ark. 1957); Katz v. Walkin-
shaw, 70 P. 663 (Cal. 1902), rev’d on other grounds, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903); United
States v. Dempsey, 635 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1994) (stating that the common law may
be altered when the reason for a rule of law ceases to exist); Mitchell v. State, 176
So. 743 (Miss. 1937); Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 98 N.E. 102 (Ohio 1912); State v.
Esser, 115 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1962).
119. Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590 (1894).
120. Anderson v. Salant, 96 A. 425, 429 (R.I. 1916).
121. See, e.g., Washlefske v. Winston, 60 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (E.D. Va. 1999) (citing
McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that courts have
long rejected such harsh doctrines), aff’d, 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000).
122. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 785 (D.R.I. 1970).
123. Turney v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 556 (1974) (explaining prisoners do enjoy Due Process protections); Johnson
v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969) (noting that prisoners have a right to petition
the government for a redress of grievances).
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right to the balance of his inmate account.  Therefore, the Fourth124
and Eleventh125 Circuits relied on an outdated common law rule in-
stead of the more recent common law ensuring a prisoner can main-
tain property rights.
It is clear that a prisoner has a property right in the balance of his
inmate account.  For instance, the Supreme Court of Iowa stated, “The
[Iowa Department of Corrections] seems not to quarrel with the notion
that an inmate’s money in prison accounts is property protected under
the Constitution.  Indeed the law in that regard appears well-set-
tled.”126  Numerous other courts have firmly held that a prisoner has
a property right in the balance of his inmate fund.127  For instance,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared unequivocally that “[t]here
is no doubt that Longmire was deprived of property—funds in his
prison account.”128  As a result, recent common law firmly establishes
that once a prison pays an inmate for his labor, those wages become
the property of the inmate.129
After examining prisoners’ property rights under English common
law and incorrectly concluding that no such rights exist, the Washlef-
ske, Givens, and Young courts supported their conclusions by next ex-
amining state statutory law.  Here, they reasoned that since a
prisoner had no rights at common law, the only rights he possessed
were those given to him by state statute.130  As discussed above, state
statutes can serve as an alternative source of a prisoner’s property
right in the balance of his inmate funds.131
124. See Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000).
125. See Givens v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 381 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2004).
126. Walters v. Grossheim, 525 N.W.2d 830, 831 (Iowa 1994).
127. See Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985) (“There is no question
that Quick’s interest in the funds in his prison account is a protected property
interest.”); State v. Ashburn, 534 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 1995) (“An inmate’s
money in prison accounts is a protected property interest.”); Artway v. Scheide-
mantel, 671 F. Supp. 330, 337 (D.N.J. 1987) (“[T]he Court finds that Artway has a
property interest in the funds in his prison account . . . .”); Ruley v. Nev. Bd. of
Prison Comm’rs, 628 F. Supp. 108, 112 (D. Nev. 1986) (“To start, it seems clear
that he has a protected property interest in the funds in his Inmate Trust Fund
account.”).
128. Longmire v. Guste, 921 F.2d 620, 623–24 (5th Cir. 1991).
129. See, e.g., Jones v. Clark, 607 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (“Clearly the plain-
tiff has a protected property interest in the $6.40 taken out of his prison ac-
count. . . . The state does not contest that a valid property interest exists.”).
130. See Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2011); Givens, 381 F.3d at 1069;
Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2000).
131. See Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185 (stating that if no right existed at English com-
mon law, a state may subsequently create one); Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs.,
151 F.3d 1194, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “state law may affirma-
tively create constitutional protected ‘new property’ interests . . . .”); Tellis v.
Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1316–17 (9th Cir. 1993).
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In Young v. Wall, the relevant provision of § 42-56-22 provided
that the balance of the inmate fund was “to be turned over to the pris-
oner at the time of his or her release from the institution, the funds
being his or her property . . . .”132  Not only did Young have a common
law right to this amount, but this unequivocal labeling of the inmate’s
funds leaves little doubt that the principal balance in the funds consti-
tuted his property.
Nevertheless, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits challenged this
unequivocal statutory language.  The Fourth Circuit argued that
while § 42-56-22 appeared to create a property right to the funds, the
right created was at best “a limited property right, defined by the
terms of the statute, which do[es] not give [the prisoner] full rights of
‘possession, control, and disposition’ over the amounts ‘earned’ and
credited to his accounts.”133  The rationale underlying this theory is
that not only was a prisoner paid in the “discretion of the director,”134
but the director controlled how the prisoner was to be paid, how a pris-
oner could spend his earnings, how earnings were to be invested, and
how any interest was to be distributed.135  As stated in Washlefske,
“Washlefske is credited with pay at a rate of $.90 per hour, but he is
not entitled to have this money paid to him in cash. . . . Washlefske
does not enjoy the right to exclude others from the funds credited to
his accounts.”136  The courts reasoned that without full rights of “pos-
session, control, and disposition,” a prison inmate was incapable of es-
tablishing that a state statute granted him a constitutionally
protected property right.137
As discussed above, it is firmly established that all citizens have a
property right in their money.138  Therefore, a prisoner has a full
property right in the money he earns unless his incarceration dramat-
ically diminishes his fundamental property rights.  In fact, the Su-
preme Court of Rhode Island pointed specifically to the fact that “a
convict can have an interest in property, while a slave cannot.”139
Furthermore, the fact that the prison director could have chosen not to
132. Young v. Wall, 359 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.R.I. 2005).
133. Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185 (quoting Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S.
156, 170 (1998)); see R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers v. State, 264 F. Supp. 2d 87, 102
(D.R.I. 2003) (“Although property rights are ordinarily created by state law, fed-
eral constitutional law determines whether the alleged interest created by the
state rises to the level of ‘property’ thereby securing the protections of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
134. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-22(a); Young, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 90.
135. Young, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 91.
136. Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185.
137. Givens v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 381 F.3d 1064, 1069 (11th Cir. 2004); Washlefske,
234 F.3d at 184.
138. See Young, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 86.
139. Anderson v. Salant, 96 A. 425, 429 (R.I. 1916) (emphasis added).
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pay the prisoner for his work is irrelevant.  As the attorney for Young
stated:
Employers often make “gratuitous” payments to employees in the form of bo-
nuses or monetary gifts.  One would never even suggest that the employee
who receives such a gratuitous payment from his employer lacks a constitu-
tionally protectable property interest in the payment once received. . . . While
an employer has a legal obligation to pay for labor and RIDOC does not, it is
insufficient to announce that constitutional property rights do not exist
merely because the circumstances under which the property (i.e., the money)
was obtained differ.140
The state, having decided to pay the inmates for their labor, cannot
trample the inmate’s property rights in the wages he has rightfully
earned.  These property rights are clear under the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court’s pronouncement that “[a] convict is neither civilly dead,
nor deprived of his rights of property” and that “a convict can have an
interest in property.”141
Furthermore, the unequivocal labeling of the prisoner’s wages as
his property in § 42-56-22 should control despite the limitations on the
prisoner’s use of his money.  The courts have recognized constitution-
ally protected property interests in many forms of property owned
under substantial restrictions.142  For example:
[U]nder the zoning and housing laws, the owner of a house in a residential
zone cannot manufacture commercial goods in the house or lease all of the
rooms in the house out to different families.  Yet the government cannot take
the home without paying just compensation.  An owner of a certificate of de-
posit, an IRA, or certain investment bonds cannot receive payment for the
amount invested prior to the expiration of the term of the investment vehicle
or some time set by law without significant penalties.  Yet the government
cannot take the principal or return on deposit without just compensation.143
Most importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that the
inability to immediately use and enjoy funds does not extinguish the
property interest.144  In Webb’s, the claimants had no right to the de-
posited fund until their claims were recognized and distribution was
ordered.145  The Court found the “lack of immediate right, however,
does not automatically bar a claimant ultimately determined to be en-
titled to all or a share of the fund from claiming a property share of
the interest, the fruit of the fund’s use, that is realized in the
interim.”146
Finally, public policy dictates that a prisoner should have a prop-
erty right to the funds in his inmate account.  With this money, a pris-
140. See Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Young v. Wall, 359 F.
Supp. 2d 84 (D.R.I. 2005) (No. 07-34S), 2007 WL 4768003, at *11.
141. Anderson, 96 A. at 429 (quoting Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590, 590 (1894)).
142. See Plaintiff’s Objection, 2007 WL 4768003, at *14.
143. Id.
144. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161–62 (1980).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 162.
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oner can “purchase goods from the prison commissary and therefore
turn his earnings into consumable goods just like other citizens.”147
Alternatively, a prisoner “can choose not to spend the money in his
account and save it” until he is no longer imprisoned.148  A prisoner
earns money through his labor in the same manner as every other
citizen.  Just like all citizens, a prisoner should enjoy a constitutional
right to the money he has earned in exchange for his labor.
Ultimately, the fact that a prisoner maintained no right to be paid
for his labor at early common law does not dictate that he now has no
property right in the money the state has decided to pay him for his
labor.  Modern common law provides that a prisoner can maintain
property rights.  Further, the statutory provision in Young v. Wall un-
equivocally stated that Young maintained a property right in his ac-
count balance.  Finally, Supreme Court precedent has firmly
established that limited use of a given piece of property does not deny
its owner a property interest in that property.  As a result, a prisoner
should be recognized as having a property right in the balance of his
inmate fund.
2. Prisoner’s Property Right to the Interest Earned on His
Account Balance
The Fourth149 and Eleventh150 Circuits concluded that a prisoner
does not have a protected property right to the interest that accrues on
his inmate account by reasoning that the common law rule of “interest
follows principal” does not apply in the prison environment.151  For
instance, the Eleventh Circuit stated, “[W]e cannot accept Givens’s
suggestion that the common law maxim that interest follows principal
applies where an inmate is involved.”152  Instead, the courts found
that the prison inmate had, at most, a limited property right in the
wages as defined by statute; yet the statutes were silent on the subject
of interest.153  Due to this silence, the courts concluded that the pris-
oner did not have a property right in such interest.
The rationale for such a contention is that “if a statute creates a
property right not previously recognized or one broader than that tra-
ditionally understood to exist, the property interest so created is de-
fined by the statute and may be withdrawn”154 because “the State
147. See Plaintiff’s Objection, 2007 WL 4768003.
148. See id.
149. See Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000).
150. See Givens v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrs., 381 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2004).
151. See Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2011); Givens, 381 F.3d at 1069;
Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 184–85.
152. Givens, 381 F.3d at 1068.
153. See Young, 642 F.3d at 54; Givens, 381 F.3d at 1070; Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 185.
154. Washlefske, 234 F.3d at 184 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970)).
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never took from him what was created by statute.”155  Yet, Washlefske
cites Goldberg v. Kelly, which discusses constitutional restraints to
the withdrawal of welfare rights.156  Thus, Goldberg does not concern
property rights but rather rights of procedural due process.157  The
only reference to property in Goldberg comes in a footnote, which ac-
knowledges that welfare benefits are more like “property” than a “gra-
tuity.”158  Speaking of welfare benefits, the Court stated that “[s]uch
benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to
receive them”159 and, thus, can be withdrawn. When the qualifica-
tions to receive welfare benefits are defined by statute, it is clear they
can be withdrawn when the recipient no longer meets the qualifica-
tions.160  Yet, this proposition applies only to state entitlements such
as welfare benefits; it does not translate into wages.  Nowhere in the
Goldberg opinion does the Supreme Court state the proposition as
broadly as it is reproduced in Washlefske, and a thorough reading of
Goldberg discloses that this is not a general principle of property
law.161  The Fourth Circuit took broad liberties to construe the Su-
preme Court precedent to fit its conclusion, yet a closer examination
reveals there is no merit in the contention that a statute granting a
broader property right than that previously existing is defined only by
statute and may be withdrawn.
Furthermore, the underlying premise that any property right in
unearned interest must flow from state statute granting such an in-
terest is in direct opposition to Supreme Court precedent holding oth-
erwise.  As discussed above, state statute is only one of three sources
that can independently establish a property right.162  Simply because
a state statute is silent regarding the interest earned on the balance of
the fund does not mean that common law cannot independently create
a property right.  This logical fallacy was identified by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Schneider v. California Department of Corrections.163 The
Ninth Circuit noted that a lower court had misinterpreted the Su-
preme Court precedent in Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth,164 which pronounced that “[p]roperty interests . . . are not cre-
155. Id. at 185.
156. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261–64.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 262 n.8.
159. Id. at 262.
160. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (stating that it is clear that a class
of persons eligible for assistance must be determined by reference to federal
standards).
161. See generally Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254.
162. See Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that the three avenues
to a claim of entitlement include common law, statutory law, and policy and
practice).
163. 151 F.3d 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 1998).
164. Id. at 1200.
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ated by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law.”165  As the court in Schnei-
der pointed out:
The Roth Court’s recognition of the unremarkable proposition that state law
may affirmatively create constitutionally protected “new property” interests in
no way implies that a State may by statute or regulation roll back or eliminate
traditional “old property” rights.166
The Supreme Court gave one example of an independent source of
property rights when it said “such as state law.”167  As such, state
statutes cannot displace other sources of property rights.  Even if the
statute is silent on the subject of interest, a property right in interest
can be found from examining “old property” rights, including the com-
mon law.168
A state’s inability to displace other sources of property rights by
enacting a state statute has also been reinforced in other cases.  For
instance, despite a contrary state statute, the Supreme Court in both
Webb’s and Phillips relied upon the traditional common law rule of
“interest follows principal” to recognize a protected property right to
earned interest income.169 Thus, while a state statute can create a
new property right, it cannot encroach upon preexisting property in-
terests such as those created by common law.  As the Ninth Circuit
stated in Schneider, “Were the rule otherwise, States could unilater-
ally dictate the content of—indeed, altogether opt out of—both the
Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause simply by statutorily
recharacterizing traditional property-law concepts.”170
As an “old property” rule, the common law rule of “interest follows
principal” cannot be displaced by a state statute holding otherwise.
This common law rule that any interest that accrues attaches as a
property right incident to the ownership of the underlying principal171
has been firmly ingrained in the common law throughout the United
States.172  The Ninth Circuit, following this common law rule, held
“that interest income of the sort at issue here is sufficiently fundamen-
tal that States may not appropriate it without implicating the Takings
Clause. . . . [T]he California inmates—like the creditors in Webb’s and
the clients in Phillips—possess a constitutionally cognizable property
interest that triggers Takings Clause scrutiny.”173
165. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (emphasis added).
166. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1998).
167. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
168. See Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1200.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 1201.
171. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 168 (1998).
172. Id. at 165.
173. Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1200–01.
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Therefore, the Fourth Circuit in Washlefske, the Eleventh Circuit
in Givens, and the First Circuit in Young erred in disregarding the
“interest follows principal” rule in favor of statutes silent on the sub-
ject of interest.  While an explicit state statute providing that a pris-
oner has a property right to interest is sufficient to create a
constitutionally cognizable property interest,174 it is assuredly not
necessary.  Property rights can, and often do, exist wholly indepen-
dently of state statutes.  Even in the context of a prison, the common
law rule of “interest follows principal” has such a long pedigree and
has gained such universal endorsement in American courts that it
provides an independent source of property rights.  As a result, a pris-
oner has a property right in both the principal amount in his account
and the interest income derived therefrom.
B. Left Unconsidered: Should “Interest Follow Principal” in
Prison Context?
One consideration left unexamined by all of the federal courts of
appeals that have considered whether a prisoner has a property right
to the interest that accrues on his inmate account is whether it is jus-
tifiable to pay a prisoner this interest given the penological objectives
underlying the correctional system.  More specifically, the courts have
failed to ask whether the payment of interest either hinders or fur-
thers penological goals such as rehabilitation, reduction of recidivism,
development of work ethic, modification of behavior and value sys-
tems, punishment, and correction.  A closer look at this consideration
reveals that the payment of interest may logically further the peno-
logical goal of rehabilitation by fostering work ethic and providing the
prisoner money for his release from prison.  More importantly, there
does not appear to be any legitimate penological rational for denying
prison inmates this property right.
It is generally accepted that one of the key purposes of the correc-
tional system is rehabilitation.175  In Rhode Island, the regulations of
RIDOC state that the purpose of the inmate work program is to “pro-
vide inmates with a wide range of work assignments that afford an
opportunity to learn job skills and develop good work habits that can
be applied to jobs after release.”176  Furthermore, in Young v. Wall,
the Prison Director Wall submitted that the penological purposes of
the work program and the provision of a personal account to inmates
were rehabilitation, reduction of recidivism, development of work
174. See, e.g., Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 1993).
175. Cf. R.I. Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State, 714 A.2d 584, 591 (R.I. 1998)
(stating that the purpose of inmate labor was rehabilitation).
176. Brief of Ashbel T. Wall, Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1862),
2010 WL 5623167, at *15.
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ethic, development of a trade to assist in gainful employment, and the
provision of money upon release from prison.177
The payment to a prisoner of interest earned on his accounts does
further penological objectives in a manner similar to that of inmate
labor programs.178  First, receiving interest on the already minimal
amounts the prisoner receives as wages may give the prisoner a mone-
tary motivation to work when he otherwise might not.  This work
would in turn help develop the prisoner’s work ethic and further
the rehabilitative objective.  As the Supreme Court stated,
“[R]ehabilitation may be best achieved by simulating procedures of a
free society to the maximum possible extent.”179  Further, one of the
stated goals of the inmate work program is to provide money to the
prisoner upon release from prison.180  Adding interest to the principal
balance would give the prisoner a larger amount upon release, which
the prisoner could then use to reestablish himself as a productive
member of the community by obtaining housing, food, clothing, or a
job.
While paying a prisoner the interest earned on his wages may fur-
ther the rehabilitative objective, this is an additional benefit to the
actual issue.  That is, rather than asking whether the policy would
further any penological objective, the court should consider whether
payment of the interest would hinder any such objective.  It is settled
that a prison inmate “retains those First Amendment rights that are
not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system . . . .”181  Chief among
these legitimate penological objectives is security and internal or-
der.182  The curtailment of certain rights is necessary to ensure the
safety of the prison staff, administrative personnel, and visitors.183
For example, a prisoner does not have the constitutional right to coun-
sel in disciplinary proceedings because providing counsel “would inevi-
177. See Motion to Dismiss, Young v. Wall, 359 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.R.I. 2005), 2007 WL
4768002, at *10.
178. Cf. Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 889
(2008) (characterizing inmate labor as fundamentally rehabilitative and educa-
tive as a means of job training).
179. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974).
180. See Motion to Dismiss, Young v. Wall, 359 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.R.I. 2005), 2007 WL
4768002, at *10.
181. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 523 (1984) (“We have insisted that prisoners be accorded those rights not
fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the
objectives of incarceration.”).
182. See Pell, 417 U.S at 823.
183. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
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tably give the proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce
their utility as a means to further correctional goals.”184
If a prison regulation or policy burdens fundamental rights, as
does the policy of not paying interest on a prisoner’s wages, the re-
viewing court should inquire whether it is “ ‘reasonably related’ to le-
gitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an
‘exaggerated response’ to those concerns.”185  As such, there is no clear
penological objective that the payment of interest would undermine.
It is difficult to imagine a situation where paying interest on the
pooled funds of the inmates in an equitable fashion would cause a se-
curity concern within a prison.  Therefore, denying this property right
is likely an “exaggerated response” to any security concern that a
prison official could posit.  Further, courts consider whether the activ-
ity is “presumptively dangerous,” which is a conclusion about the rea-
sonableness of the prison restriction in light of the articulated security
concerns.186  Once again, nothing about the policy of paying interest
on inmate funds suggests it is dangerous.  There is no “valid, rational
connection”187 between the payment of interest on inmate funds and
any legitimate government interest.  Any connection would be so re-
mote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.
As a result, there is no logical penological rationale for denying a
prisoner his constitutional property right to the interest accruing on
the wages deposited in his inmate account.  While another purpose of
the correction system is retributive in nature, and denying a prisoner
the interest he earns could be a form of punishment, rehabilitation
and correction of offenders are important penological objectives.188  In
fact, early courts established that the purpose of legally adjudicated
punishment should not be vengeance, but rather deterrence of the of-
fender and other prospective offenders from crime, assistance in their
rehabilitation, and the protection of society.189  Because the work pro-
gram and inmate accounts are geared toward the rehabilitative objec-
tive, the denial of interest should be evaluated in comparison to that
objective.  This evaluation reveals that denying interest to inmates
undermines the rehabilitative objective.  As a result, giving a prisoner
the interest he earns on his wages is in the best interest of the correc-
tional system’s legitimate objectives.
184. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974).
185. Turney v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987).
186. Id. at 89.
187. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984).
188. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (stating that valid pe-
nological objectives include rehabilitation of prisoners).
189. People v. Friend, 306 P.2d 463 (Cal. 1957); see also Williams v. People, 337 U.S.
241, 248 (1949) (“Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of
criminal jurisprudence.”).
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C. Implications of Denying Interest to Inmates
As discussed above, the majority of courts considering whether a
prisoner has a property right to the interest earned on his inmate ac-
counts have denied such a right.  While each court has used slightly
different reasoning to reach their conclusions, the courts almost uni-
versally have held that state statutes defined the nature and extent of
the prisoner’s property interest, rather than following the common
law rule of “interest follows principal.”  This deference to statutory
provisions poses grave concerns to constitutional rights in the United
States.
Foremost, the relationship between liberty and property cannot be
overlooked.  These two fundamental principles are linked in the politi-
cal philosophy of John Locke, regarded generally as the “philosophical
father of American constitutionalism.”190  Locke posits that political
society exists to preserve “property” in the broad sense, including the
“Lives, Liberties and Estates” which inherently belonged to man
before the formation of civil society.191  Today, this belief is demon-
strated by Justice Stewart’s affirmation of the relationship between
liberty and property:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.
Property does not have rights.  People have rights.  The right to enjoy property
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to
travel, is in truth a “personal” right . . . a fundamental interdependence exists
between the personal right in liberty and the personal right in property.
Neither could have meaning without the other.192
As a result, the denial of a protected property interest denies to indi-
viduals the liberty afforded to them in the Constitution.  According to
Locke, this liberty is of such importance that it predates civilized soci-
ety.193  As such, it predates the establishment of legal and penological
systems that currently place offenders in confinement for their trans-
gressions against society.  Therefore, a prisoner is still afforded the
fundamental liberty envisioned by Locke.  In addition, a prisoner does
not give up all of his liberties upon entering confinement.194  In fact, a
prisoner is enabled to maintain his property rights.195  As a result,
courts denying a prisoner his property rights implicate the fundamen-
tal liberties he maintains while incarcerated.
190. Karen H. Flax, Liberty, Property, and the Burger Court: The Entitlement Doctrine
in Transition, 60 TUL. L. REV. 889, 916 (1986).
191. Id.
192. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
193. Sheldon Gelman, “Life” and “Liberty”: Their Original Meaning, Historical Ante-
cedents, and Current Significance in the Debate over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 585, 628 (1994).
194. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524 (1984); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 555 (1974).
195. Anderson v. Salant, 96 A. 425, 431 (R.I. 1916).
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Furthermore, the state’s ability to unilaterally redefine property
interests by statute could lead to the arbitrary use of government
power.  If the courts continue to sanction such behavior, a state could
simply ignore the common law rule of “interest follows principal” by
dictating statutorily that interest is to accrue to some entity other
than the prisoner himself.  By doing so, the state is effectively
sidestepping the Takings Clause by denying the prisoner a property
interest and thereby acquiring the ability to take the funds.  Yet, this
is the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment was designed to prevent as a shield against the arbitrary use of
government power.  The Ninth Circuit in Schneider, stating that
states may not encroach upon old property interests, addressed the
concern of arbitrary governmental power by saying, “were the rule
otherwise, States could unilaterally dictate the content of—indeed opt
out of—both the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause . . . .”196
Also, the prison director, Wall, testified, “As Director, I made this deci-
sion, in large part, because I believe it is far more consistent with the
public interest to pay interest earned into the State General Fund,
rather than to the inmates.”197  Thus, Wall was effectively able to take
the interest earned on the wages from those who earned it and give it
to those who did not.
It is important to remember that whether a prisoner has a prop-
erty right in unearned interest is considered in the context of the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against unconstitutional takings.  The Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee was “designed to bar Government from forc-
ing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”198  Serving as a
protection to all citizens, the Fifth Amendment should be carefully
protected.  In fact, the denial of a property right in unearned interest
to prison inmates should concern all citizens.  While a prisoner has
been convicted of a criminal offense and therefore deemed deserving of
punishment, he maintains many of the same constitutional rights of
ordinary citizens.199  A prisoner can maintain an interest in prop-
erty.200  When a prisoner is denied these rights, the courts are inching
closer to denying these rights to every citizen.  Eventually, a court
broadly interpreting these cases could use these principles once appli-
cable only to a prisoner and gradually apply them to the ordinary citi-
zen.  This denial of constitutional rights should therefore be a grave
concern for all citizens.
196. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1998).
197. Motion for Summary Judgment, Young v. Wall, 359 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.R.I. 2005),
2007 WL 4768002, at *3 (emphasis added).
198. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
199. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–56.
200. Anderson v. Salant, 96 A. 425, 431 (R.I. 1916).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion tracks the circuit split regarding whether
a prisoner has a constitutionally protected property right to the inter-
est earned on his inmate account.  This Note examined the traditional
sources of property rights, described the holdings of each federal cir-
cuit that has examined the issue, and analyzed the truncation of prop-
erty rights in the prison context.  This Note then identified the most
important issues that should be considered by any court considering
this question.  Each reviewing court should consider the extent to
which a prisoner maintains a property right in the principle balance
in his inmate account while in prison, the applicability of the common
law rule of “interest follows principle” in the prison environment, and
the degree to which denying such a property right hinders the peno-
logical objectives of the prison system.
As each court reviews these important legal considerations, judges
must not be too quick to defer to the judgments of prison officials.
Rather, prison practices, such as denying inmates the interest they
earn on their inmate accounts, that are alleged to violate the Constitu-
tion deserve a thorough and comprehensive judicial review.  Further,
the extent of a prisoner’s property rights under the Constitution
should not depend on the jurisdiction in which the prison is located.
Therefore, the Supreme Court of the United States should grant certi-
orari to a case presenting this issue and uniformly resolve the issue.
While no court has adequately addressed the issue, a thorough review
of each consideration presented in this Note should lead the Supreme
Court to conclude that a prison inmate does have a constitutionally
protected property right to interest earned on the funds in his inmate
account.
